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Why do pluralistic media systems emerge? Comparing media change in the Czech 
Republic and in Russia after the collapse of Communism 
 
 
Abstract 
A quarter century after the collapse of Communism in the former Eastern bloc, a wide range 
of scholarly projects have been undertaken to compare and theorize processes of media 
change in the region. One question that scholars have sought to address is: what were the 
factors that crucially impacted how these media landscapes evolved? This essay aims to 
contribute to this debate by juxtaposing media change in two selected cases: the Czech 
Republic (as a best-case scenario in terms of convergence with the Western model) and 
Russia (as a scenario where convergence has been limited). Based on secondary analysis of a 
wide range of sources, the essay systematically exposes 11 crucial differences between the 
two countries and illustrates how these have impacted the processes of media change. The 
conclusion sets out how these findings could serve as a starting point and source of 
inspiration for future comparative research.   
 
Keywords: comparative media, comparative communication, political communication, global 
media and social change, Russia, Czech Republic, media history, media change, communism, 
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Since the fall of Communism in the former Eastern bloc, media landscapes in the region 
have taken starkly diverging paths of development. In some countries, for instance the Czech 
Republic, media systems have emerged that closely resemble Western models. These media 
landscapes rank highly in the Western rankings of press freedom, provided annually by such 
organizations as Freedom House (2013) or Reporters Without Borders (2013a). By contrast, 
the media landscapes of other post-Communist countries, for instance of Russia, appear at the 
bottom of these lists. Here, media landscapes have evolved that have been labelled ‘Neo-
Soviet’ (Oates, 2007), ‘Eurasian’ (de Smaele, 1999) or ‘statist commercialized’ (Vartanova, 
2011).         
In the scholarly literature, a wide range of projects have been undertaken in the past two 
decades to compare the media landscapes of the post-Soviet world and to theorize processes 
of media change (for recent contributions to this literature, consider: Dobrek-Ostrovska and 
Glowacki, 2008; Downey and Mihelj, 2012; Gross and Jakubowicz, 2013; Jakubowicz, 2004, 
2007; Jakubowicz and Süskösd, 2008; Stetka, 2012; Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012; Örnebring, 
2013; Voltmer 2006; Voltmer 2013). One specific question that scholars have sought to 
address is: what were the crucial factors that impacted how these media landscapes evolved 
after the collapse of Communism? Mihelj (2012: 67), for instance, has argued that two types 
of media system emerged in the region, in terms of how they responded to ethno-cultural 
diversity: integrated media systems (providing minority content mostly within mainstream 
media) and segmented media systems (divided along ethno-cultural lines). Mihelj concluded 
that the path which a media system took was ‘affected primarily by the ethnic composition of 
the domestic population, historical factors such as the trajectory of nation-state building, the 
presence of recent inter-ethnic conflicts, and the presence of a kin-state and kin-state media 
that are perceived as a threat’ (Mihelj, 2012: 82).  
Approaching another aspect of the question, Downey (2012) has investigated how the 
influx of foreign capital impacts the development of political mass media. Referring to Hallin 
and Mancini’s (2004) three models of the press, he concludes that transnational capital has 
tended to ‘operate as a moderator of polarized pluralism’, because media companies with 
foreign capital have typically tried ‘to disentangle themselves from a particular political elite’ 
(Downey, 2012: 133). In yet another approach, Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008: 20-23) point 
to politics, the economy, and culture as ‘key areas of society’ that affect media change. 
However, they do not provide an in-depth comparative analysis of how these factors have 
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impacted media change in different countries. By contrast, Mungiu-Pippidi (2008) assumes a 
two-way relationship between media and politics and presents a circular model of media 
change. She argues that, after the two common initial phases of liberalization and 
deregulation, post-Communist media systems could take diverging paths towards either 
‘oligarchization’ or ‘competitive politics’ (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008: 91).   
While important steps in the field have thus been taken, Rupnik and Zielonka (2013: 14) 
have recently highlighted the mass media as remaining one of the most ‘poorly understood 
factor[s] in the new democracies’ of the former Eastern bloc. In a similar vein, Hallin and 
Mancini (2013: 16) conclude in a literature review that ‘research literatures on Eastern 
European media systems are still in the process of emergence’. As they lament, to date most 
of the contributions to this field have been made in edited volumes that often lack ‘original 
research, full documentation of particular cases, or unifying theoretical frameworks’ (Hallin 
and Mancini, 2013: 16-7).  
This article aims to advance this literature by juxtaposing, within a common theoretical 
and methodological framework, two selected cases of media transition towards what has been 
referred to as the ‘Western’ model (Gross and Jakubowicz, 2013: 7-12). The Czech Republic1 
(as a best-case scenario in terms of adapting to the Western model) and Russia (as a scenario 
where adaptation has been limited) are selected. In order to facilitate structured comparison, 
the article suggests a six-area analytical framework that is then employed to guide the search 
for causal factors. Moving systematically through these six areas, the argument identifies 11 
factors that have crucially affected media change towards the Western model in the two 
countries. The functioning of each of these 11 factors is rendered plausible by presenting 
empirical evidence from each of the two countries.  
By so doing, the essay hopes to serve as a starting point and source of inspiration for 
future studies, accomplishing both what Mahoney (2008) has referred to as ‘population-
oriented’ and as ‘case-oriented’ research. To date, population-oriented research based on 
statistical analysis in particular appears to be largely absent from the literature on 
comparative media systems in the post-Communist world. While these latter approaches must 
certainly be applied with great caution (Downey and Mihelj, 2012: 8-10), they could produce 
compelling explanations, as a recent study by Egorov et al. (2009) on a related topic has 
illustrated. To work toward these goals, the remainder of the article is structured as follows. 
A first section develops the research design and suggests a six-area analytical framework. 
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The subsequent six sections move through these areas of analysis, identifying 11 crucial 
factors and illustrating how these have impacted on media change. A concluding section 
summarizes the line of argument and points to promising paths for future research.     
DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Broadly following George and Bennett’s (2005: 73-88) methodological advice on 
designing case-study research, this section proceeds in four steps. First, it specifies the 
research objectives. Then, it discusses the selection of cases and the concepts to be observed. 
Finally, methods of data collection and interpretation are examined.      
Specification of research objectives 
As pointed out in the introduction, this study aims to systematically identify, and to 
discuss in some depth, a tentative set of key factors that may have promoted or hampered 
media change towards the Western model in the post-Soviet region after the collapse of 
Communism in the late 1980s.  The article thus aims to generate knowledge primarily of 
idiographic and heuristic value: it seeks to suggest and render plausible a number of 
important variables, hypotheses, and causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005: 75-6).  
Selecting cases to observe 
In order to accomplish these goals, this essay adopts a ‘most-different system’ design 
(della Porta, 2008: 214-217) and juxtaposes media transition in the Czech Republic and in 
Russia. It thus selects two cases that differ widely on what we might refer to as an ‘outcome 
variable’: the emergence of ‘Western’ or ‘European’ types of media landscapes (Gross and 
Jakubowicz, 2013: 7-12). The leading ‘press freedom’ indices provided by Freedom House 
(2013) and Reporters Without Borders (2013a) appear to be largely consistent and valid 
measures for estimating the degree to which different media systems deviate from the 
Western model (Becker et al., 2007). These indices are presently widely applied in 
population-based comparative research (cf., for instance, Egorov et al., 2009).2  
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Figure 1. Freedom House Press Freedom Scores, from 100 (free) to 0 (unfree) 
 
(Source: Freedom House, 2013) 
Figure 1 illustrates how the two countries have scored on the Freedom House Index of 
Press Freedom in the past two decades. Freedom House classifies media landscapes as free 
(70-100 points), partly free (40-69), or unfree (0-39). The Czech Republic joined the 
community of countries with ‘free’ media systems in the early 1990s, and has not left it 
since.3 By contrast, the status of Russian media began as ‘partly free’ in the early 1990s and 
deteriorated to ‘unfree’ in the early 2000s. It is these contrasting developments, and the 
factors that may have contributed to the two countries embarking on their diverging paths, 
that this essay will set out to explore.         
Specification of the dimensions of comparison 
To identify factors that have impacted media change in the two countries, this essay 
suggests moving systematically through the following six areas: (1) journalistic culture, (2) 
political system, (3) economic system, (4) citizens’ media-related beliefs, (5) socio-economic 
development, and (6) external factors. This six-area analytical framework (cf. Figure 2) was 
developed in the course of a larger research project carried out by the author, based on 
secondary analysis of more than one hundred academic studies of media change across the 
post-Soviet world (Toepfl, 2011a). As this project found, the vast majority of these studies 
discussed factors that fell within one of these six areas (cf. Toepfl, 2011a: 48, 66-69).  
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Figure 2. A six-area analytical framework: Locating factors that impact on media change  
 
(Source: Author; cf. Toepfl, 2011a: 48, 66-69) 
The arrows in Figure 2 highlight an epistemological premise of this approach: it assumes 
that complex processes at the macro level (like media change towards the Western model) are 
a ‘result of complex interaction effects’ of factors and ‘various forms of multicausality’ 
(Héretier, 2008: 75). Moreover, the approach is rooted in a case-oriented understanding of 
causality (Mahoney, 2008). It primarily pursues what Héretier (2008: 76) calls ‘causal 
reconstruction’. Explanation is implemented through narrative prose, and causal relationships 
are rendered plausible by tracing historical processes (Mahoney, 2008: 412; Héretier, 2008; 
della Porta, 2008; Mihelj and Downey, 2013, 8-10). 
As is also visible from Figure 2, this study will not focus on variables that are widely 
understood as core features of a media system, such as the number of media outlets, their 
respective audience reach, or specific provisions of media law. These variables can be 
considered as being captured by what is referred to here as the outcome variable of ‘press 
freedom’ or ‘adaptation to the Western model’. The outcome variable is regarded as reflected 
in the scores of a country on the Freedom House Index (cf. Figure 1). Moreover, a number of 
previous studies have already investigated the change in various core features of post-
8 
 
Communist media systems, for instance regarding ownership structures (cf., for instance, 
Stetka, 2012) or public service television (Jakubowicz, 2004). By contrast, this essay aims to 
draw attention to a set of factors that have implicitly impacted media change.  
Methods of data collection 
To render causal relationships plausible, the essay will draw on the widest possible range 
of sources available on the two countries and on a larger research project of the author 
(Toepfl, 2011a). Since the goal of this article is to provide a comprehensive synopsis of 
factors as they are widely considered influential in this body of academic literature, the space 
to elaborate on the functioning of each factor is limited. However, in order to mitigate this 
problem, the essay will reference a range of studies with narrower scope. While most of the 
cited works are authored by academics, non-academic reports and statistical data will also be 
considered.  In the following sections, the study will move through the six areas of analysis 
and discuss 11 factors. The next section begins by zooming in on two key factors within the 
area of journalistic culture. 
JOURNALISTIC CULTURE  
By journalistic culture, I understand in this essay the professional norms and wider 
political and social beliefs according to which the journalists of a country process information 
and interpret social reality. In this respect, a major difference between the two cases resides 
in the degree of legitimacy that Communist rule enjoyed amongst journalists before the 
regimes collapse. Czech journalists were far more alienated from the old regime than their 
Russian counterparts (Kaplan 1991; Olofsson, 2000; Steinsdorff, 1993). In this context, 
Kaplan (1991) points to the collective historical experiences of Czech intellectuals in the 
fight for press freedom, which he dates back to the Habsburg monarchy, summarizing their 
consequences as follows:  
These historical realities were not lost on the journalists, writers and artists who, during 
the ensuing years of oppression, both under Nazis and Communists, continued the struggle 
to regain freedom of expression. (Kaplan 1991: 32-33)    
By contrast, Russian journalists cannot invoke a similar tradition of resistance. Even in the 
era of Glasnost at the end of the 1980s, only a part of the journalistic community called for 
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unrestricted press freedom and radical democratization, while others remained skeptical and 
supportive of the old regime (Steinsdorff, 1993: 283-301).  
A second difference between the two cases concerns the degree to which institutions of 
journalism education and their curricula were adapted to Western standards in the years after 
the collapse of the regimes. In the Czech case, the previous Faculty of Journalism at the 
Charles University in Prague was dismantled immediately after the collapse of the 
Communist regime, in 1990. A new Institute of Journalism was created within a newly 
founded Faculty of Social Sciences, with its professors being elected by students (cf. Kaplan, 
1991: 55; Splichal, 1994: 70). By contrast, in Russia, the curricula, training methods and staff 
of the 30 Faculties of Journalism that operated across the country in the 1990s remained 
largely unchanged in the first decade after the regime’s collapse, as Trautmann (2002: 228) 
argues. While Vartanova et al. (2010) also highlight the crucial changes that were introduced 
in many journalism programs in the 1990s and 2000s, the basic principles of journalism 
education, as presented in their report, appear still to be markedly different from Western 
standards (cf. Vartanova et al., 2010: 205-6). 
These two factors certainly help to explain the vast differences in the professional cultures 
of journalists as these can be observed today. In Russia, a professional culture emerged that 
differs substantially, and in complex ways, from those in Western democracies. This culture 
was rendered visible in the early 1990s in a rather ‘hesitant debate on the ethical reorientation 
and the resistance to reforms within the professional association’ (Steinsdorff, 1993: 283; cf. 
Olofsson, 2000: 31-70). In a similar vein, by the end of the 1990s, a study by Svetlana Pasti 
(2005: 1) of 30 journalists working in St. Petersburg concluded that: 
there are two types of professional roles within contemporary journalism, representing 
two types of professional subculture: the old generation (practitioners of the Soviet era) 
and the new generation (who have joined the profession since 1990). Despite their 
polarities, both generations of journalism accept the political function of journalism as a 
propaganda machine for the power elite during elections and other important events.   
By the end of the 2000s, journalistic culture across Russia seemed still to differ starkly 
from that of Western democracies. Erzikova and Lowrey (2010: 354) found, in a study of 
four newsrooms in a central Russian province, that regional journalists had ‘retreated from a 
number of values widely accepted by journalists across democratic systems’. By contrast, 
10 
 
journalistic culture in the Czech Republic adapted rapidly to the Western model. On the basis 
of a survey of 2,585 Czech journalists carried out in 2005, for instance, Volek and Jirák 
(2007: 372-373) concluded that the professional self-image of Czech journalists was more or 
less comparable to that of their Western European colleagues.  The study identified four 
different approaches to the role of a journalist: educational, advocate/adversarial, 
neutral/objective, and career/pragmatic (Volek and Jirák, 2007).  
The more comprehensively Western norms of information processing and interpretation 
are adopted among the journalists of a country, the better a media system will perform, 
obviously, on a series of criteria monitored in the questionnaires of Freedom House and 
Reporters Without Borders. This holds, for instance, for items tapping into concepts such as 
‘self-censorship’ among journalists or media coverage that ‘reflects a wide range of 
viewpoints’ (Freedom House, 2011; Reporters without Borders, 2013). The two widely 
different journalistic cultures that developed in the two countries can thus be seen as 
immediately impacting media change towards the Western model. 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 
By political system, I understand in this essay the complex of institutions that is concerned 
with making and implementing authoritative decisions for a society (cf. Easton, 1957). At the 
top of these institutions, after the collapse of the old regime, the new political decision-
makers turned out – in both countries under investigation -- to be rather reluctant to unleash 
the media from political control (Trautmann, 2002; Kettle, 1997). In the literature, similar 
tendencies amongst new political elites are reported from across the post-Communist world, 
and substantiated by a great deal of evidence. Mungiu-Pippidi (2000: 12), for instance, finds 
in her study of The Failed Reform of State Television in Central Eastern Europe that 
‘political groups both on the right and the left of the political spectrum share[d] a common 
conception of the media as an instrument of political power.’ She suggests interpreting these 
tendencies as a ‘rational strategy’ of political actors under the given circumstances (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2000: 12). In the case of Bulgaria, Tzankoff (2001: 79) makes a similar point, 
exposing how the influential position of Head of Television was reshuffled eleven times in 
the years between 1989 and 2000, for political reasons. In the same vein, Kettle (1997: 52) 
laments the fact that political decision-makers in the Czech Republic showed a clear ‘lack of 
respect’ for the independence of the media. Even the former dissident and newly elected 
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president Vaclav Havel, for instance, caused a stir when, as early as 1990, he stated publicly 
that journalists who disclosed state secrets needed to be imprisoned (Prevratil and Perkner, 
1991: 81).  
At the most general level, measures that would strengthen the political independence of 
the media were thus typically introduced at times when those in power came under pressure 
from external actors. The two countries under investigation here, however, differed greatly in 
the degree to which the political decision-making centre was put under pressure during 
various periods after the regime change. A first important source of pressure located within 
the political system was the political opposition. The impact of this factor can be easily traced 
in the course of Russian media transition. The privatization of the Russian television sector, 
for instance, was ushered in between 1992 and 1993, a time that was dominated by a struggle 
for power between parliament and the presidency (Zassoursky, 2004: 3-34; Trautmann, 
2002). During the same period, in 1992, the Russian parliament attempted to enact a new 
press law aimed at restricting press freedom. However, then-President Boris Yeltsin refused 
to sign the law (Steinsdorff, 1993: 228). A decade later, in the early 2000s, a similarly fierce 
political competition or strong opposition did not exist. It was in these years that President 
Vladimir Putin was able to push through a series of measures that tightened the control of the 
political leadership over the mass media, and in particular over television (Koltsova, 2006: 
192-204). By comparison, in the Czech Republic power was far less centralized and 
alternation of power between different political groups occurred regularly. In this political 
environment, new media laws could be passed, and even reasonably unpartisan public service 
media could be established (cf. Jirak and Köpplova, 2008).    
A second important source of pressure is the judicial system (which I conceive of here, in 
a broader sense, as part of the political system). The two countries under investigation differ 
greatly also with regard to this factor. In the Russian case, the dependence of legal courts on 
political elites has been widely criticized in the literature ever since the collapse of 
Communism. The perpetrators of violent crimes against critical journalists, for instance, have 
often been prosecuted only hesitantly, if at all (Trautmann, 2002: 227). Lipman (2010: 104) 
even argues that ‘if the Kremlin should not be held directly responsible for masterminding 
murders, it certainly bears responsibility for the atmosphere of lawlessness in which 
contracted assassinations are commonly practiced as a way to get rid of adversaries or 
competitors.’ In sharp contrast, Czech courts have typically prosecuted those responsible for 
12 
 
politically motivated violence against journalists effectively and sentenced even the sponsors 
of these crimes (Freedom House, 2004). To summarize, the independence of courts and the 
extent of political competition can be seen as features of a political system that have heavily 
affected the processes of media change in the two countries. As illustrated above, differences 
in these two factors impacted rather straightforwardly on a series of normative criteria 
monitored in the questionnaires of Freedom House and Reporters without Borders, assessing 
for instance the appropriateness of the ‘legal environment’ or the levels of ‘violence’ and 
‘intimidation’ of journalists (Reporters without Borders, 2013; Freedom House, 2011; cf. 
Toepfl, 2011b).          
ECONOMIC SYSTEM  
The economic system is understood here as a complex of institutions aiming to produce 
goods and services for a society, consisting most importantly of enterprises and banks. The 
two countries under investigation also differ crucially with regard to a number of key 
variables in this area of analysis. A first and highly impactful difference resides in the 
differing volumes of the advertising markets. In studies of media change in the Czech 
Republic, with growth rates in some years in double digits, the size of advertising markets 
has typically not even been mentioned as a potential factor impacting media change (Smid, 
2005: 668; Jirak and Köpplova, 2008). By contrast, studies of the Russian case regularly 
highlight the lack of advertising revenue as severely hampering media change throughout the 
1990s (Steinsdorff, 1993: 295; Koltsova, 2006). In 2000, a commission of experts estimated 
the total advertising budget of the Russian media at between USD 1.1 billion and 1.4 billion. 
By contrast, profits (including state subsidies and sales) were gauged at USD 7 billion 
(Koltsova, 2006: 37). In other words, the Russian media received 70 per cent of their income 
from unknown sources. It was only in the early 2000s that the Russian advertising market 
skyrocketed. In the years between 2000 and 2005, its size quadrupled to reach USD 4.65 
billion (Seferova, 2006: 3). By this time, however, Russia’s leading TV stations had already 
been taken over either by the Russian state or by state-owned companies. Thus it was actors 
close to the state who benefited most from the surge in the markets. The assumed causal 
mechanism that links weak advertising markets with slow media change towards the Western 
model is obvious: a lack of advertising revenues leaves media outlets vulnerable to the 
influence of key political actors, which is widely regarded as problematic by the 
measurement tools of Western press freedom NGOs (cf. Reporters without Borders, 2013; 
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Freedom House, 2011).  
A second important economic variable also differs crucially in the two cases: the share of 
foreign ownership in the media market. In the Czech Republic, print media were in the 2000s 
almost exclusively in the hands of foreign investors (Lambrecht, 2001: 174-175; Šmid 2005: 
662; Jirak and Köpplova, 2008). By the same token, the country’s most widely watched 
private television channel, TV Nova, was owned by an American enterprise (Open Society 
Institute, 2005: 529). This ‘selling-off’ of media companies to foreign companies was 
frequently criticized by Czech commentators, who feared a ‘loss of sovereignty’ and 
denounced these developments as ‘legal theft’ of Czech property (Čelovský, 2001: 22). And 
yet, the Western investors also introduced new technologies and brought with them large 
amounts of capital. Moreover, they were typically not closely intertwined with local political 
elites but acted mainly from profit-oriented motives (Jirak and Köpplova, 2008; Downey, 
2012). By contrast, in Russia, in the two decades after the collapse of the Communist regime, 
foreign capital was largely absent from the realm of political media. Here, wealthy local elites 
acquired media outlets. However, these local elites did so mostly not for the sake of making a 
profit, but in order to use their media outlets as resources in the struggle for political power 
(Koltsova, 2006: 73-85; Zassoursky, 2004). A high share of foreign ownership in the media 
market can thus be expected to promote media evolution towards the Western model, since it 
reduces the power of the local government to ‘determine […] news and information content’ 
(Freedom House, 211; cf. also Downey, 2012)  
But how could a situation emerge in Russia where economic elites were wealthy, but 
advertisement markets weak? A third economic variable that differs widely in the two cases 
helps to explain this ostensible paradox: the share of natural resources in gross domestic 
income. In the 2000s, this indicator fluctuated around the 30 per cent mark for Russia, while 
it was around 1 per cent for the Czech Republic (World Bank, 2013). Russia’s natural 
resources were exploited by a small number of large companies which, in turn, generated the 
billions of USD in political subsidies that flew into the media system each year in the early 
2000s (cf. above). By the mid-2000s, for instance, the state-owned gas-monopolist Gazprom 
was amongst the four biggest media owners in the country (Vartanova and Smirnov, 2009: 
129-130). Even non-state primary sector companies that owned mass media outlets typically 
aimed to cultivate their relationships with political elites in order to secure their revenues – if 
not their existence (cf. Koltsova, 2006; Vartanova, 2011). Obviously, these companies 
14 
 
depended much less on advertising their products to consumers. Against this backdrop, the 
existence of a small number of large primary-sector companies can be considered as 
detrimental to rapid media change towards the Western model, since these can easily be 
leveraged by state authorities to ‘influence and manipulate’ media content (cf. Freedom 
House, 2011). The causal mechanisms here, obviously, must typically be analysed in close 
interrelation with the factors rooted in the political system (cf. previous paragraph).     
CITZIZENS’ MEDIA-RELATED ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS  
The two countries also differ markedly with regard to a number of relevant media-related 
attitudes and beliefs, as widely shared among the population. A first issue here is the 
approach to the Western idea of a ‘free press’ or ‘press freedom’. In the Czech Republic, by 
the end of the 1990s, as many as 89 per cent of citizens believed that press freedom was 
important for a well-functioning democracy (cf. Druker, 1999: 76). In sharp contrast, even by 
the mid-2000s, 46 per cent of Russians still stated in opinion polls that the country could 
benefit from tighter control over the media (Levada, 2004). This latter survey from Russia is 
all the more remarkable since it was conducted after President Vladimir Putin had pushed 
through in the early 2000s a series of measures curbing media freedom (cf. above). 
Similar differences exist with regard to how much citizens in the two countries ‘trust’ their 
political mass media. By the mid-2000s, 59 per cent of Czech citizens said they trusted their 
mass media. The media thus achieved the highest level of trust amongst all political 
institutions, with political parties ranking last (Eurobarometer, 2004). While these results 
appear to be relatively persistent over time, Russian opinion polls measuring the complex 
concept of ‘trust’ in the media are more difficult to interpret. Their findings can range 
anywhere between 5 and 75 per cent, depending on the manner in which the question is 
formulated (Mickiewicz, 2006; White and McAllister, 2006; Wyman, 1997: 79; Trautmann, 
2002: 229). Most importantly, these polls are evidence that Russians have developed rather 
complex patterns of attitudes towards their mass media. In qualitative studies, many 
respondents have been found to consider on principle any belief in ‘objectivity’ as naïve. 
Many have stated that mass media outlets function inevitably, and in any society, as tools of 
those in power (Mickiewicz, 2006: 206-7; Toepfl, 2013, forthcoming; White, 2006: 213-14).   
These stark differences in media-related beliefs have impacted strongly and in a variety of 
ways on the process of media change towards the Western model. For instance, these media-
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related beliefs heavily affect the decisions of citizens on which media sources to follow and 
which news products to buy. In Russia, popular magazines like ‘Cosmopolitan’, ‘Playboy’, or 
‘Good Housekeeping’ were highly profitable even in the 1990s, while opposition political 
newspapers hardly ever reached a circulation of more than several tens of thousands (vgl. 
Toepfl, 2011a: 228). Citizens’ consumer preferences thus certainly steer the allocation of 
advertising revenue, and can thus work in close interaction with the factor of ‘size of 
advertising markets’ discussed in the previous section. In combination, these two factors can 
greatly enhance the state’s abilities ‘to dominate the country’s information system’ (Freedom 
House, 2011). 
 
In addition, media-related attitudes have affected the extent to which protest could be 
mobilized in situations where political elites set out to curb media freedom. In the Czech 
Republic, for instance, 50,000 protesters took to Vaclav Square in Prague in 2000, when 
political elites attempted to reshuffle leading positions in public TV all too obviously in 
accordance with political considerations (Smid, 2005: 665). The Russian media could hardly 
count on similar support from civil society. In 2001, for instance, when the state company 
Gazprom took control of NTV, one of Russia’s leading TV channels, no wave of public 
protests arose (Koltsova, 2006: 192-204). While the demonstrations in the Czech Republic 
resulted in the removal of the director general of Czech Television (Jirak and Köpplova, 
2008: 20), the journalists at Russian NTV lost their fight for independence. In these ways, the 
media-related beliefs of citizens have been closely linked with the degree to which state 
authorities or other powerful societal actors are able to  accomplish ‘excessive concentration 
of media ownership’ in their own hands (Freedom House, 2011).   
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
By socio-economic development, I allude here to a highly disputed set of macro-indicators 
developed against the backdrop of Western-centred modernization theories in the early 1950s 
(cf. Fischer et al., 2004). The set is typically seen as including items such as level of 
education, degree of urbanization, or availability of new communication technologies. In this 
brief analysis, I shall focus on gross domestic product (GDP), which is one of the most 
widely studied indicators within the highly disputed set. Figure 3 traces the development of 
GDP per capita in the two countries after the regime collapse. All data quoted in the 
following are retrieved from the World Bank (2013) database. As Figure 3 illustrates, GDP 
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per capita in the Czech Republic grew persistently from 1992 until the financial crisis of 
2008, from USD 2,780 (1992) to USD 21,627 (2008). There was only a brief phase of 
stagnation in the second half of the 1990s. By contrast, Russian GDP decreased, after the 
collapse of the old regime, from USD 3,485 in 1991 to a low of USD 1,338 in 1999. Since 
2000, the figure has increased nearly tenfold to USD 12,995 in 2011. 
Figure 3. GDP per capita after the regime collapse (in current USD)    
 
(Source: World Bank, 2013) 
Figure 3 clearly shows how Russian society went through a phase of severe economic 
depression in the 1990s. In the same decade, the country tried to open up politically and strive 
towards Western ideals of democracy. The attempted introduction of democratic elements of 
government thus occurred alongside a severe economic depression and a time of social 
‘chaos’, as perceived by many Russian citizens (cf. Koltsova, 2006: 22-44; 60-72; 
Trautmann, 2002: 226). In this decade, the media fell into the hands of competing power 
groups; terms like ‘media wars’, ‘information wars’ and ‘killer journalism’ emerged 
(Koltsova, 2006: 38). By providing highly unreliable, sensational and corrupt reporting, the 
media fully discredited themselves in the eyes of citizens. The impact of this collective 
experience of ‘democratic chaos’ in the 1990s on Russian political culture can hardly be 
over-estimated.  
As this interpretation of the data in Figure 3 suggests, the development in GDP can be 
interpreted as an important factor that needs to be considered when explaining processes of 
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media change. However, there seems to be no straightforward correlation between growth of 
GDP and development towards western-style media landscapes.  In the Russian case, in the 
1990s the economy shrank while scores on the Freedom House indicator of press freedom 
remained at a relatively high level (cf. Figures 1 and 2). By contrast, in the 2000sthe 
economy grew while scores on the press freedom indicator deteriorated sharply. The impact 
of socio-economic development on media change seems thus to be more complex. In the 
Russian case, the occurrence of an economic depression alongside a free – or even  anarchic 
– media landscape deeply discredited the idea of media freedom among the Russian 
population. This is an excellent example of the complex interaction of causal factors pointed 
out in the methods section: the socio-economic depression of the 1990s resulted in negative 
attitudes amongst citizens towards press freedom, which in turn had a strong impact on media 
change in the subsequent decade (cf. previous paragraph).  
EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Under the heading of external factors, I suggest scrutinizing all factors here that originate 
outside the nation-state but interact with the factors discussed in the previous paragraphs. In 
this area, one of the most impactful differences between the two countries can be seen in 
what Levitsky and Way (2010: 23) conceptualize as ‘linkage to the West’. By this term, 
Levitsky and Way understand ‘the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and 
organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and 
information) between particular countries and the United States and the EU’ (2010: 23). As 
they point out, at the most general level, linkage to the West has been extensive in Central 
and Eastern Europe, while it has been low in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Where 
linkage is high, external actors can exert ‘democratizing pressure’ (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 
23). 
In the Russian case, linkage to the West remained limited throughout the 1990s (cf. 
Levitsky and Way, 2010: 186-7). Russia’s strategic and economic potential did not allow for 
external pressure. The country possessed massive oil reserves and was the world’s largest 
supplier of natural gas. Furthermore, it was a nuclear power and had a vote on the United 
Nation’s Security Council. In the 2000s, rising energy prices further strengthened its position. 
As Levitsky and Way (2010: 187) summarize, ‘if vulnerability to external democratizing 
pressure [in Russia] was low in the 1990s, it was almost nonexistent in the 2000s.’ 
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By contrast, linkage to the West has been extensive in the Czech case. Most importantly, 
Western European states had the power to grant – or deny – the country accession to the 
European Union (EU). Particularly in the years prior to the country’s entry to the EU in 2004,   
the old EU member states had a strong potential to pressure for reforms. This pressure was 
immediately visible in the media sector. In 2000, for instance, the Czech law on broadcasting 
transposed the EU directive on ‘Television Without Frontiers’ into national law (Smid, 2005: 
661). Furthermore, the EU’s influence was also pivotal in a wide range of areas that crucially 
affected media change, i.e. the economy, civil society, and politics. To summarize, linkage 
with the West has probably been one of the most powerful factors in terms of  impact on 
media change in the region. It has heavily shaped the overall ‘legal’, ‘political’ and 
‘economic’ environment within which media outlets operate (Freedom House, 2011). If we 
look at Freedom House’s map of press freedom today, a divide seems to separate the ‘free’ 
and ‘partly free’ media landscape of EU-member countries from the ‘unfree’ post-Soviet 
countries further to the East.  
CONCLUSION 
This essay has juxtaposed media change in the Czech Republic, as a best-case scenario in 
terms of convergence with the Western model, with media change in Russia, as a scenario 
where adaptation to the Western model has been rather limited. To guide the search for 
factors that have impacted media change, an analytical framework was suggested that 
envisaged six areas: (1) journalistic culture, (2) political system, (3) the economy, (4) media-
related attitudes, (5) socio-economic development, and (6) external factors. 
Why, then, has a pluralistic media system emerged in the Czech Republic, but not in 
Russia? Proceeding along the six areas of analysis, this essay systematically highlights a 
nexus of 11 interacting factors and illustrates how crucially these have affected media change 
in the two countries. This set of factors comprises: (1) the degree of legitimacy that 
Communist rule enjoyed amongst journalists before the collapse of the old regime; (2) the 
degree to which institutions of journalism  education were adapted to Western standards; (3) 
the strength of the political opposition; (4) the degree of independence of the judicial system; 
(5) the size of advertising markets; (6) the share of foreign ownership in the media market; 
(7) the share of natural resources in gross domestic income; (8) citizens’ attitudes towards 
press freedom; (9) citizens’ trust in the mass media; (10) the development of GDP; and (11) 
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the degree of linkage to the West.  
What can we conclude from the findings and conclusions of this study about media change 
in other post-Communist countries, or in other regions of the world? Clearly, there are some 
limitations in this regard. The set of factors discussed here cannot be considered either as 
comprehensive or as applying in the same way in all countries across the region. Some highly 
impactful causal mechanisms at work in neighbouring countries may have been overlooked in 
this essay, while others may be specific to the two countries under investigation. Mungiu-
Pippidi (2008: 90), for instance, has argued that the Czech Republic is an exceptional case in 
the sense that none of the other East European countries had ‘a serious democratic tradition’. 
To the extent that the roots of Czech journalistic culture were traced back here to the early 
20th century, this feature may thus be rather unique to the Czech case.  
However, despite these obvious limitations, I believe that the findings of this essay can 
advance the academic debate in at least two ways. Firstly, both the six-area analytical 
framework and the set of 11 factors suggested in this article can serve as a point of reference 
and inspiration for future ‘case-oriented research’ on media change in the post-Communist 
world (Mahoney, 2008). Scholars working on conditions of media change in other countries 
may find it intriguing to discuss the way these factors have worked out in these specific 
cases. They could modify, extend and refine the conclusions of this study and, by so doing, 
contribute to the accumulation of knowledge about media change in the post-Soviet world. 
Secondly, the set of factors discussed here could also serve as a starting point for future 
population-oriented research. Some factors presented in the previous sections could easily be 
quantified; this holds, for instance, for GDP per capita, the size of advertising markets, or the 
degree of political competition. It might certainly be an intellectual challenge to 
operationalize these variables in ways that facilitate meaningful comparison across different 
sets of countries.  However, this appears viable, as Egorov et al. (2009) have compellingly 
demonstrated.  
Both of these lines of inquiry seem to open up a whole range of intriguing opportunities 
for future research. Against this backdrop, it is hoped that this explorative essay has made a 
modest contribution to advancing the academic body of literature on media change in the 
post-Soviet region – a body of literature that may, as Hallin and Mancini (2013: 16) have 
recently argued, currently be only in the ‘process of emergence’.     
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1 The Czech Republic emerged on 1 January 1993 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Where the 
analysis refers to the ‘Czech case’ prior to 1993, this means the situation in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. 
2 The author is fully aware that working with these concepts suggests a highly normative, Western-centric 
perspective. He also agrees that it is important to deconstruct Western perspectives and to generate deeper 
understandings of non-Western contexts (Curran and Park, 2000). However, for the specific purpose of this 
study, and taking the view point of European policy-makers, why some media landscapes in the post-Soviet 
region today comply to a considerable extent with European standards and others less so appears a highly 
pertinent and relevant question. 
3 The Czech Republic achieved the best score amongst all Central and Eastern European countries in 1994, 
when Freedom House published its first set of detailed data on the region. Even though other countries such as 
Latvia, Estonia, or Slovenia achieved slightly better scores in later years, the Czech Republic clearly remained 
in the top-performing group in the following decades (cf. Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008: 30).     
21 
 
REFERENCES 
Becker LB, Vlad T and Nusser N (2007) An evaluation of press freedom indicators. 
International Communication Gazette 69(1): 5–28. 
Čelovský B (2001) Konecčeskéhotisku? Ostrava: Tilia. 
Curran J and Park M-J (eds) (2000) De-Westernizing Media Studies. London: Routledge. 
Della Porta D (2008) Comparative analysis: Case-oriented versus variable-oriented research. 
In: Della Porta D and Keating M (eds) Approaches and Methodologies in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.198–222. 
De Smaele H (1999) The applicability of Western media models on the Russian media 
system. European Journal of Communication 14(2): 173–189. 
Dobek-Ostrowska B and Głowacki M (eds) (2008) Comparing Media Systems in Central 
Europe: Between Commercialization and Politicization. Wrocław: Wydawn. 
Downey J (2012) Transnational capital, media differentiation, and institutional isomorphism 
in Central and Eastern European media systems. In: Downey J and Mihelj S (eds) 
Central and Eastern European Media in Comparative Perspective: Politics, Economy 
and Culture. Burlington: Ashgate, pp.63–88. 
Downey J and Mihelj S (eds) (2012) Central and Eastern European Media in Comparative 
Perspective: Politics, Economy and Culture. Burlington: Ashgate. 
Druker J (1999) Naked bodies, runaway ratings: TV Nova and the Czech Republic. Media 
Studies Journal 13(3): 70–77. 
Easton D (1957) An approach to the analysis of political systems. World Politics 9(3): 383–
400. 
Egorov G, Guriev S and Sonin K (2009) Why resource-poor dictators allow freer media: A 
theory and evidence from panel data. American Political Science Review 103(4): 645–
668. 
Erzikova E and Lowrey W (2010) Seeking safe ground: Russian regional journalists’ 
withdrawal from civic service journalism. Journalism Studies11(3): 343–358. 
Eurobarometer (2004) National report. Executive summary. Czech Republic. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/exec_cz.pdf (accessed 23 May 
2013). 
Fischer K, Hödl G, Maral-Hanak I and Parnreiter C (2004) (eds) Entwicklung und 
Unterentwicklung. Eine Einführung in Probleme, Theorien und Strategien. 
Mandelbaum Verlag: Wien. 
Freedom House (2004) Country report: Czech Republic. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2004/czech-republic (accessed 
May 2013). 
Freedom House (2011) Methodology. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2011/methodology (accessed 
June 2013). 
Freedom House (2013) 2013 Freedom of the press data. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press (accessed May 2013). 
George A and Bennett A (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
22 
 
Gross P and Jakubowicz K (eds) (2013) Media Transformations in the Post-communist 
World: Eastern Europe’s Tortured Path to Change. Lanham: Lexington. 
Hallin D Mancini P (2004) Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hallin D and Mancini P (2013) ‘Comparing media systems’ between Eastern and Western 
Europe. In: Gross P and Jakubowicz K (eds) Media Transformations in the Post-
communist World: Eastern Europe’s Tortured Path to Change. Lanham: Lexington, 
pp.15–32. 
Héritier A (2008) Causal explanation. In: Della Porta D and Keating M (eds) Approaches and 
Methodologies in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.61–79. 
Jakubowicz K (2004) Ideas in our heads: Introduction of PSB as part of media system change 
in Central and Eastern Europe. European Journal of Communication 19(1): 53–74. 
Jakubowicz K (2007) Rude Awakening: Social and Media Change in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Cresskill: Hampton Press. 
Jakubowicz K and Sükösd M (2008a) Twelve concepts regarding media system evolution and 
democratization in post-communist societies. In: Jakubowicz K and Sükösd M (eds) 
Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in 
a Global Perspective. Bristol: Intellect, pp.9–40. 
Jakubowicz K and Sükösd M (eds) (2008b) Finding the Right Place on the Map. Central and 
Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective. Bristol: Intellect. 
Jirák J and Köpplová B (2008) The reality show called democratization: Transformation of 
the Czech media after 1989. Global Media Journal 4(1): 7–23. 
Kaplan FL (1991) Czechoslovakia’s press law: Shaping the media’s future. In: Hester A and 
Reybold E (eds) Revolutions for Freedom: The Mass Media in Eastern and Central 
Europe. Athens: Center for International Communication Training and Research, 
pp.31–58. 
Kettle S (1996) The development of the Czech media since the fall of communism. Journal 
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 12(4): 42–60. 
Koltsova O (2006) News Media and Power in Russia. London: Routledge. 
Lambrecht O and Schröter K (2001) Transformation der Medien in der Tschechischen 
Republik. In: Thomaß B and Tzankoff M (eds) Medien und Transformation in den 
postkommunistischen Staaten Osteuropas. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 
pp.167–186. 
Levada (2004) Rossiyane o svobodeslova. Available at: 
http://www.levada.ru/press/2004102802.html (accessed May 2013). 
Levitsky S and Way LA (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the 
Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lipman M (2010) Rethinking Russia: Freedom of expression without freedom of the press. 
Journal of International Affairs 63(2): 153–169. 
Mahoney J (2008) Toward a unified theory of causality. Comparative Political Studies 41(4–
5): 412–436. 
Mickiewicz E (2006) Does “trust” mean attention, comprehension, and acceptance? 
Paradoxes of Russian Viewers News Perception. In: Voltmer K (ed) Mass media and 
political communication in new democracies. London: Routledge, pp. 189–209. 
23 
 
 Mihelj S (2012) Between segmentation and integration: Media systems and ethno-cultural 
diversity in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Downey J and Mihelj S (eds) Central and 
Eastern European Media in Comparative Perspective: Politics, Economy and 
Culture. Burlington: Ashgate, pp.63–88. 
Mungiu-Pippidi A (2000) State into public: The failed reform of state TV in East Central 
Europe. The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy: 
Working Paper Series. Available at: http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/2000_06_mungiu-pippidi.pdf (accessed 23 May 2013). 
Mungiu-Pippidi A (2008) How media and politics shape each other in the new Europe. In: 
Jakubowicz K and Sükösd M (eds) Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and 
Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective. Bristol: Intellect, pp.87–
100. 
Oates S (2007) Theneo-Soviet model of the media. Europe-Asia Studies 59(8): 1279–1297. 
Olofsson K (2000) The cultural debate on abolishing censorship. In: Olofsson K and 
Ekecrantz J (eds) Russian Reports: Studies in Post-Communist Transformation of 
Media and Journalism. Stockholm: Södertörn University, pp.31–70. 
Open Society Institute (ed) (2005) Television across Europe: regulation, policy, and 
independence. Budapest: Open Society Institute. 
 Pasti S (2005) Two generations of contemporary Russian journalists. European Journal of 
Communication 20(1): 89–115. 
Pfetsch B and Voltmer K (2012) Negotiating control: Political communication cultures in 
Bulgaria and Poland. The International Journal of Press/Politics 17(4): 388–406. 
Prevratil R and Perkner S (1991) Nach der Euphorie der Freiheit die ganz normalen 
‘schwierigen Zeiten’. Medien in der Tschechoslowakei. Media Perspektiven (2): 77–
89. 
Örnebring H (2013) Anything you can do, I can do better? Professional journalists on citizen 
journalism in six European countries. International Communication Gazette, 75(1), 
35–53.  
Reporters without Borders (2013a) Press Freedom Index 2013. Available at: 
http://en.rsf.org/press- freedom-index-2013,1054.html (accessed May 2013). 
Reporters without Borders (2013b) Questionnaire. Available at: http://rsf.org/index/qEN.html 
(accessed June 2013). 
Rupnik J and Zielonka J (2013) Introduction: The state of democracy 20 years on: Domestic 
and external factors. East European Politics & Societies 27(1): 3–25. 
Seferova M (2006) Advertising in post-Soviet Russia: New trends. Conference paper. 
Available at: 
http://www.llc.manchester.ac.uk/research/projects/sovietrussiantelevisionculture/conf
erences/mass-media-post-soviet-russia/ (accessed May 2013). 
Šmíd M (2005) Medien in der Tschechischen Republik. In: Hans-Bredow-Institute for Media 
Research, University of Hamburg (ed.) Internationales Handbuch Medien. Baden-
Baden: Nomos, pp.661–670. 
Splichal S (1994) Media beyond Socialism: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Steinsdorff S von (1994) Russland auf dem Weg zur Meinungsfreiheit: die Pluralisierung der 
russischen Presse zwischen 1985 und 1993. Münster: LIT Verlag. 
24 
 
Stetka V (2012) From multinationals to business tycoons. Media ownership and journalistic 
autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe. The International Journal of Press/Politics 
17(4): 433–456. 
Toepfl F (2011a) Mediensysteme in Transformationsprozessen. Wie entstehen pluralistische 
Mediensysteme – und warum nicht? Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Toepfl F (2011b) Managing public outrage: Power, scandal, and new media in contemporary 
Russia. New Media & Society 13(8): 1301–1319. 
Toepfl F (2013) Making sense of the news in a hybrid regime: How young Russians decode 
state TV and an oppositional blog. Journal of Communication 63(2): 244–265. 
Toepfl F (forthcoming). Four facets of critical news literacy in a non-democratic regime:  
How young Russians navigate their news. European Journal of Communication. 
Trautmann L (2002) Die Medien im russischen Transformationsprozess: Akteur oder 
Instrument der staatlichen Politik? New York: Peter Lang. 
Tzankoff M (2001) Der Transformationsprozess in Bulgarien und die Entwicklung der 
postsozialistischen Medienlandschaft. In: Thomaß B and Tzankoff M (eds) Medien 
und Transformation in den postkommunistischen Staaten Osteuropas. Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, pp.65–94. 
Vartanova E (2011) The Russian media model in the context of post-Soviet dynamics. In: 
Hallin DC and Mancini P (eds) Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western 
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.119–142. 
Vartanova E, Lukina M, Svitich L and Shiryaeva A (2010) Between tradition and innovation: 
Journalism education in Russia. In: Josephi B (ed.) Journalism Education in 
Countries with Limited Media Freedom. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, pp.199–
216. 
Vartanova E and Smirnov S (2009) A brief review of the condition of the media market in 
Russia: The general situation. In: Vartanova E, Nieminen H and Salminen M-M (eds) 
Perspectives to the Media in Russia: ‘Western’ Interests and Russian Developments. 
Aleksanteri Series 4/2009. Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, pp. 117-144. 
Volek J and Jirák J (2007) Professional self-image of the Czech journalists: Selected 
attributes. Mediální studia II(4): 358–375. 
Voltmer K (2006) Mass Media and New Democracies. London: Routledge. 
Voltmer K (2013) The Media in Transitional Democracies. Cambridge: Polity. 
White S and McAllister I (2006) Politics and the media in post-communist Russia. In: 
Voltmer K (ed.) Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies. 
London: Routledge, pp.210–227. 
World Bank (2013) Data base. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org (accessed 23 May 
2013). 
Wyman M (1996) Public Opinion in Postcommunist Russia. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Zassoursky I (2004) Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. New York: ME Sharpe. 
 
 
